profiles are being charged much more than what their higher risk and cost should garner. An analysis of "A-minus" loans, loans at the lowest risk level and lowest price level for subprime loans, found that at least one percent of the note interest rate alone being charged to these borrowers could not be explained by risk or cost of the loans. 10 In addition to interest, origination fees and points charged on predatory loans are frequently greatly in excess of the slightly higher origination and servicing costs to be expected for subprime risk loans, and without any reduction in interest rates as is typically bought by points paid in the prime market.
11
The CEO of one predatory lender told The New York Times that his company "had recently reduced its origination fees to an average of about 10 percent because of … the 'sound-bite effect of the high origination fees. '" 12 This was after it had come to light that the lender had been charging fees as high as twenty-five percent, in addition to high interest rates. 13 On the risk side, despite economic boom times in this country and record homeownership rates, foreclosures on owner-occupied dwellings during the mid-to late 1990s more than doubled in many of the central cities where predatory loans are concentrated.
14 The New York Times reported in April 2003: " [I] n the last nine years, despite a decrease of 20 percent in foreclosures home loans are generally graded as "A-" or "Alt A", "B", "C", and "D" paper, in increasing order of price, in theory to correspond with a declining order of creditworthiness. 10 Howard Lax, Michael Manti, Paul Raca & Peter Zorn, Subprime Lending: An Investigation of Economic Efficiency, 15:3 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 533, 569 (2004) . This study examined note interest rates only, and did not consider the further differentials in pricing caused by higher origination points and fees paid by subprime borrowers.
11 Id. at 540. Eric Stein cites a report that one major subprime lender, Household, adds a standard charge of 7.25% in fees, and cites other sources reporting fees of 7% to over 10% for subprime loans. Eric Stein, Quantifying the Economic Cost of Predatory Lending 14-15 & nn. 50-51 (Coalition for Responsible Lending, March 2001), reprinted in "Predatory Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact, and Responses", Hearing Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, 107 th Congress, 1 st Sess. (July 26, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 Senate Hrg] . The State of Washington Department of Financial Institutions Examination of Household confirms the 7.25% figure, which was reported as "points" but which did not buy down the borrower's interest rate and therefore should be properly viewed as an origination fee. See Household Examination, supra n. 6 at 5, 7, 9, 16, 18 & 48. 12 Henriques & Bergman, supra n. 9 at A1. This is in contrast to origination fees on conventional loans that are typically about 1%, and rarely exceed 2%. Id. Internal documents indicate that as of 1999, the lender, First Alliance Mortgage Company, started all loan negotiations at 15.9 points, and would negotiate with borrowers back to an average of 12 points. See Lehman Brothers' Report on First Alliance Mortgage at 3 (on file with author). 13 Henriques & Bergman, supra n. 9 at A1. The same article reported the story of a woman who thought she had borrowed about $51,000, but later discovered she had signed for over $64,000, because 26% in fees were added to the loan at origination.
14 See, e.g., Testimony of William Apgar, Assistant Secretary for Housing & Federal Housing Commissioner, in "Predatory Lending Practices," Hearing Before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 106 th Cong., 2d Sess., May 24, 2000 [hereinafter 2000 , at 199, 203 (citing studies demonstrating that: in Chicago, foreclosures doubled between 1993 and 1998, and foreclosures of subprime loans increased by a factor of 40; and in Atlanta, although foreclosures overall decreased between 1996 and 1999, subprime foreclosures more than tripled, and by 1999 were 16% of all foreclosures but only 9% of originations); ACORN, Equity Strippers: The Impact of Subprime Lending in Philadelphia (May 2000) , reprinted in 2001 Senate Hrg., supra n. 11 at 410, 414 (foreclosures in Philadelphia increased over 100% between 1995 and 2000, due to increase in subprime originations and prevalence of subprime foreclosures).
on prime-rate mortgages, the national foreclosure rate has risen by 68 percent…" 15 Because between eighty and ninety percent of subprime loans are refinancings or second mortgages, not home purchase loans, subprime lending has not substantially increased homeownership rates. 16 To the contrary, the most comprehensive national study of foreclosures and subprime loans indicates that over twenty percent of all first-lien subprime refinance loans originated in 1999 had entered foreclosure by December 2003, a mere four years later; sixty percent of these borrowers had lost their homes and another ten to twenty percent were still in foreclosure as at December 2003. 17 Some securitized subprime loan pools have foreclosure rates as high as twenty-eight percent, 18 and the rate at which subprime loans enter foreclosure quarterly is over 15 Dennis Hevesi, Jump in Subprime Loans Spurs Fight Over Abuses, N.Y. TIMES B10 (Apr. 25, 2003) . Because these figures are based on MBAA statistics, they probably understate the true foreclosure rate of subprime loans. MBAA statistics understate subprime foreclosures because they exclude statistics on loans from finance companies, a fertile source of subprime and predatory loans. See, e.g., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Working Paper: Economic Issues in Predatory Lending (July 30, 2003) [hereinafter, OCC Working Paper] at 7 n. ‡ ("predatory lending abuses are largely confined to the subprime mortgage market" consisting mostly of "mortgage companies and finance companies" (internal citation omitted)). The MBAA data also do not reflect which loans ended in foreclosure or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, and which loans were redeemed out of foreclosure. 16 See, e.g., HUD-Treasury Report, supra n. 7 at 29 & 31 (80% of subprime loans in HMDA data, and 82% according to industry data, are refinancing loans, while an additional number are home improvement loans); id. at 3 ("A majority of mortgages in the subprime market are used for consumer debt rather than housing [purchase or home equity] purposes."); Testimony of Professor Cathy Lesser Mansfield, 2000 House Hrg., supra n. 14, at 378, 386 (reporting that for the top sixteen subprime lenders, who together issue just under half the outstanding subprime home equity debt in the U.S., only 10% of the loans were purchase money loans); Pennsylvania 23-27 (March 15, 2005) (explaining that between 2000 and 2003, the number of sheriff foreclosure sales in Pennsylvania was over 55,000, more than the number of households in Pennsylvania's third-largest city, Allentown, and attributing the majority of these foreclosures to subprime loans). Even industry voluntary survey figures, which as noted in note 15, supra, understate subprime loan foreclosures, report high subprime loan foreclosure rates. On average for 2004, the Mortgage Bankers Association released data that .49% of prime loans were in foreclosure each quarter, but almost eight times as many (3.98%) of subprime loans were in foreclosure. See www.mortgagebankers.org/news/2005/pr0317.html. 18 Mansfield Testimony, supra n. 16 at 385. The loans in the particular pool examined were originated in 1998 and examined in 2001, meaning that in about two years these loans were already failing at these high rates. The loans were securitized by WMC Mortgage, formerly Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Company, a wholesale lender started in 1955 that in the third quarter of 2002 was the first internet-based lender to hit the billion dollar mark for quarterly loan volume. www.prweb.com/releases/2002/10/prweb48712.php. See also Sandra Fleishman, Landmark Predatory Lending Suit Settled, WASH POST E1 (Feb. 24 2005) (noting a foreclosure rate of one in three loans made over a three year time period by one mortgage lender). The Mortgage Information Corporation, an industry financial database firm, reported in 2000 that the rate at which home loans were becoming "seriously delinquent" (presumably 90 days) was .53 percent for prime mortgages, 6.8 percent for B-rated loans and 20.5 percent for Drated loans. Pennington-Cross et al., supra n. 7 at iv.
http://law.bepress.com/alea/15th/art2
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Page 6 ten times the rate at which prime loans enter foreclosure. 19 Subprime lenders are responsible for a tremendous proportion of foreclosures, given that at the time most subprime borrowers received the loans, they had a successful track record of mortgage payments to their previous lender. 20 Further, the risk of foreclosure for many of these loans should have been evident at the time of origination; subprime loans that result in foreclosure do so about twice as quickly, in terms of time from origination to foreclosure, as do prime loans that end up in foreclosure. 21 Moreover, the households paying these high prices and facing this high risk of foreclosure are disproportionately African-American, Latino, and low to moderate income, 22 households that already have fewer financial resources to spare and significantly lower homeownership rates 23 to begin with. The elderly have also been particularly hard-hit. 24 The , 2001) . Although one would expect subprime loans to default at higher rates than prime loans, because many subprime loans are made to higher risk borrowers, there is nothing to indicate that subprime borrowers know how very much higher their likelihood of foreclosure is. 21 See, e.g., id. at 264-65 (reporting mean delay from origination to filing of foreclosure petition of 1.8 years for subprime foreclosures, but 3.2 years for prime foreclosures in Baltimore in first quarter of 2000; median delay of 2 years versus 4 years in Atlanta in June 1996 through 1999; and median delay of 3 years versus 7 years in Boston in 1995 through 1999). , almost 30% were subprime, whereas only about 10% of loans to whites were subprime, and that African-Americans received 18% of the subprime loans but only 6% of the prime loans originated); id. at 8 (21% of loans to low-to-moderate income borrowers are subprime, whereas 18.5% of loans to middle-income borrowers are subprime); James R. From a legal and policy perspective, what is puzzling about this problem is that borrowers are agreeing to these overpriced and overly risky home loans against their own selfinterest and despite extensive federal regulation, including mandated disclosures regarding loan price, and, for some loans, risk of foreclosure. This paper argues that the problem is not so puzzling when the structure of the home loan market and consumer decisionmaking within that market are carefully analyzed. Federal law regarding home lending is based on a rational actor model of borrower decisionmaking, with some allowances for bounded rationality. But borrowers frequently depart from the law's model in a variety of ways, leading to a failure to price shop and a failure to make considered, good decisions regarding risk when they obtain home loans. These departures from the rationality assumption include widespread and quite steadfast cognitive limitations, heuristics, biases, and emotional coping mechanisms. This paper explains how sellers are able to take advantage of these impediments to optimal decisionmaking and the structure of the market to convince significant numbers of borrowers to take loans that are overpriced and overly risky, and why these borrowers agree to these loans that are not in their own best interests. 27 Only an analysis rooted in the empirical information we have about decisionmaking, not only in the laboratory but also more specifically in the modern home loan market, can guide sound future lawmaking in this area. Such an analysis must be sensitive to how different historical experiences and sociological and market conditions impact the decisionmaking of different segments of consumers.
The impediments to optimal rational decisionmaking can be roughly divided into those that inhibit borrower price shopping, and those that inhibit good borrower decisionmaking about Combating Predatory Lending 99-102 (Jan. 2004) (reporting on targeting of consumers over age 65 for predatory home loans) [hereinafter, GAO Report]. risk, although price and risk are closely related in any loan product from both the sellers' and the borrowers' perspectives. 28 Encouraging price shopping and price efficiency, and awarding any surplus from the transaction to the consumer, are fairly uncontested social goals. The most difficult questions on the price side are how to overcome decisionmaking barriers to achieve efficient, competitive pricing, and why the market will not operate to achieve such pricing on its own. On the risk side, the impediments to good decisionmaking about risk of loss of the home create the same dilemma found in other risk contexts; giving consumers more risk information is, depending on the disclosure itself and the particular consumer's psychology, likely to be useless for some and an over-deterrent to others, due to bimodal responses to risk. Moreover, at both a normative and a conceptual level, defining reasonable, acceptable, or good levels of risk is tricky. We have not confronted this issue historically, because uniformity of loan products, credit rationing, and usury laws hemmed in home loan risk. But because we cannot rely on disclosures to resolve this issue, to formulate good public policy in today's credit market, we must define the maximum risk levels we are willing to allow consumers, their families, and their neighborhoods to bear.
II. Predatory Lending & the Evolution of the Home Loan Market
Recent high default and foreclosure rates run counter to national policies of promoting homeownership and stable and efficient financial markets, the bases for the federal government's involvement in the home loan market since the Depression. Until the late 1960s, the federal government's involvement in the market expanded the availability of home loan credit through providing and facilitating liquidity and encouraging standardization of loan terms into the traditional 30-year fully amortizing product. During the same period, government capital reserves requirements for depository institutions, usury limits, and both government and private race discrimination in home lending limited the availability of home loan credit to nonwhites and borrowers who were perceived to be potentially high risk. Credit rationing as a result of the 28 Risk impacts pricing on the seller's side because sellers attempt to price loans so as to ensure at least a competitive (if not higher) rate of return, over a pool of loans, based on default and prepayment likelihood (i.e., risk from the seller's perspective) and cost of origination and servicing. Generally, loans with higher probabilities of default should be priced higher to cover the probabilistically anticipated losses of both principal and future interest payment stream caused by default, although equity obtainable at foreclosure can also cover these losses in whole or in part.
From the borrower's perspective, inflated opportunistic price terms can create higher risk terms to the extent that a borrower, who might have a high likelihood of being able to make payments on fair terms, is less likely to be able to afford the monthly payments on an overpriced loan, and therefore is placed at high risk of default. Risk of default is partly endogenous to the loan transaction in a number of other respects as well. Not only larger monthly payments, but also the longer length of some larger loans, balloon payment features, and larger total loan size can increase the risk of default. The longer the loan period the more opportunities for adverse life events to interfere with ability to make payments. A large balloon payment can create a risk of default if refinancing or payoff is not possible when the balloon comes due. (A balloon is a large lump sum payment due on a loan; a simple balloon loan would be a loan on which only interest payments are made over the life of the loan, with the principal due in a lump sum "balloon" at the end of the loan term. However, a loan can be partially amortizing as well, such that some of the principal is paid during the life of the loan, or a loan can involve negative amortization, such that the principal increases during the life of the loan.) A larger total loan means that there is less equity in the home to extract through a refinancing to tide a borrower through loan payments during an adverse life event.
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In response to the interest rate disintermediation crisis 29 of the 1970s, most state usury limits were raised significantly, abolished, and/or preempted for home loans by federal law.
30
Beginning in the late 1980s, the federal government began to enforce laws prohibiting discrimination in home lending, 31 although consolidation in the banking industry in the same time period also led to the withdrawal of brick and mortar presence of depository institutions from some minority communities.
32 Data collection and computer processing advances in the 1980s and 1990s revolutionized the ability of lenders to model borrower behavior so as to more accurately forecast lending costs, including costs imposed by borrower risk of default. As a result, lenders gained the ability to better sort borrowers according to risk and cost and engage in risk-based pricing rather than credit rationing.
33 Large scale securitization of home loans starting 29 In the 1970s, most lenders were dependent on deposits as a source of loan funds, because home loans had not yet been widely securitized. The credit crunch of the 1970s caused interest rates to rise, such that lenders with outstanding fixed rate home loans were taking in less interest income than they needed to give out in interest on deposits to convince depositors to keep their deposits at the lender instead of in alternative, higher-interest-earning investment vehicles. This phenomenon is referred to as disintermediation. REV 1561 REV , 1566 REV -68 (1995 . Due to advances in creditworthiness data collection and processing, the asymmetric information and "adverse" selection assumptions today frequently run in the opposite direction, with the originating lender having greater information and doing the "selecting." The observable result, as theory would predict, has been a move toward risk-based pricing and away from credit rationing. Collectively, these changes ushered in what is called "subprime" lending, meaning home loans at prices higher than those available in the traditional low-risk "prime" market, to account for increased costs and risks entailed in lending to a broader and less creditworthy borrower market. Within the 1990s, subprime lending went from less than one percent of the market to over ten percent in number of originations, and in 2004 was nearly a quarter of market originations. Subprime loans tend not to be used for home purchases, particularly not for firsttime homeowners, and instead between eighty and ninety percent of subprime loans are home equity loans or cash out refinancings, meaning that the borrower is taking equity out of the home, primarily for general consumer credit purposes. The reason for this is that most homebuyers, particularly first-time homebuyers, have not amassed large downpayments, so most purchase money loans do not involve large up-front fees or points, and are at high loan to value ratios ("LTVs"), with little equity remaining in the home as security for the loan. Because subprime loans generally rely more heavily on the equity in the home and up-front fees, in addition to higher interest rates, to cover higher origination, servicing, and default risk costs, than do prime loans, subprime loans are less likely to be used for home purchase.
Although subprime loans obviously can be made on fair price and reasonable risk terms, a subset of subprime loans are overpriced and overly risky. 35 These predatory loans would include: high-priced subprime loans given to borrowers who present a prime, low risk and cost profile to the lender; subprime loans to borrowers who present a subprime risk and cost profile, but at prices beyond what these risks and costs should garner; and loans that present a high risk of foreclosure and loss of home to the borrower when other, less harmful and on the whole preferable, alternatives to such a loan exist.
36 Alternatives could include: declaring bankruptcy but taking a homestead exemption; selling the home on the open market rather than losing it at a foreclosure sale 37 ; and/or foregoing the benefits of the loan, i.e., the loan proceeds. Even more 34 See, e.g., OCC Working Paper, supra n. 15 at 5 (attributing "skyrocket[ing]" of subprime lending in 1990s in part to "increased securitization of subprime loans which facilitated expanded capital flows to the subprime market"). In 1995, $18.5 billion in subprime loans was securitized; in 2000, that figure was almost $56 billion. See HUD/Treasury Report, supra note 7 at 40. 35 Although a prime loan could be predatory if it were overpriced and/or overly risky, as a practical matter, the prime market is quite price-competitive and involves very low risk. Therefore, as a practical matter, predatory lending is a subset of subprime lending. 36 The line between overpriced and competitively priced loans can thus be drawn by reference to market data (although perhaps only by lenders themselves, given their control over the relevant loan-level borrower data). The line between higher-than-prime-risk subprime lending and overly risky predatory lending is not possible to draw without a defined normative ceiling of maximum acceptable risk levels, and/or a cost-benefit analysis of the loan and alternatives to that loan, as explained further below.
37 A foreclosure sale being likely to be both: (a) more emotionally costly than an ordinary sale, over which the homeowner has some sense of agency and control, and (b) less financially profitable than an ordinary sale, given the inefficiency of foreclosure markets.
than subprime loans generally, predatory loans are almost always refinancings or second mortgages, because they involve large up-front fees financed by existing equity and are typically made at low LTVs 38 so that equity remains in the home for the lender to recover at foreclosure.
39
Because subprime lending is by definition riskier than prime lending, one story that could be told about recent increases in foreclosure rates is that this is not a sign of predatory lending, but rather reflects the unleashing of a pent-up, rational demand for risky loans, previously denied entry to the market by credit rationing. However, such a story would require riskier borrowers to understand the risk presented by these loans, and to prefer to take that risk over alternatives to the loan. The data from the field paint a different picture. Not only do brokers and loan officers actively work to convince borrowers to "lower their guard" and to trust that these are "risk-free" loans, 40 but fifteen percent of all home borrowers, when asked in a national survey about the 38 An exception to this rule occurs when a predatory lender refinances or "flips" a borrower repeatedly, charging large financed fees and prepayment penalties at each flip, until there is no equity left in the home, preventing the borrower from refinancing elsewhere. A foreclosure after repeated flipping would appear to cost the lender because equity does not cover the face value of the loan plus foreclosure costs. However, the lender could find such a series of loans very profitable on account of multiple financed origination fees and prepayment penalties.
39 Because subprime lending is largely refinancings and seconds, these loans are primarily made to people who already own their homes; only between 10 and 20% of subprime loans are purchase money loans, and only some of these are to new homeowners. The gains in homeownership, starting in the early 1990s for whites and in the mid1990s for African-Americans and Latinos, have occurred primarily due to expanded prime lending, and only to a lesser extent due to non-predatory subprime lending. Predatory loans would virtually never be used to expand homeownership, because the lender relies heavily on equity in the home, which is rarely present for a first-time homebuyer. Recent expansion in homeownership has been largely due to the strong economy in the 1990s, automation of application processing resulting in a decrease in origination costs, and the decrease and near elimination of downpayment requirements for prime purchase money loans. Prime lenders have been able to decrease downpayment requirements because of a recognition that most borrowers will not strategically default even when the LTV exceeds 100%, both because people have moral (or ego-related) and prospective credit history reasons not to default, and because people display an endowment effect of valuing their own homes, once they live in them, at a greater than market value. Further, rising home prices, particularly in the late 1990s in inner cities, has meant that the window during which a prime no-downpayment loan is near 100% LTV is quite short; within a couple of years of rising home values, the LTV decreases, giving the lender adequate equity in case of foreclosure.
Eliminating downpayment requirements helps achieve homeownership for all people who lack the ability (due to rental housing costs) or willpower to save but have an income on which they could afford monthly mortgage payments. It also helps families achieve homeownership at younger ages, before they could have saved for a downpayment (which increases total instantaneous homeownership rates but does not increase lifetime homeownership rates). Eliminating downpayment requirements has been especially crucial for African-American and Latino homebuyers, because they lack the intergenerational wealth transfers frequently used by whites to make downpayments. African-American and Latino families have dramatically lower median levels of household wealth than whites (2000 Census figures are just under $8,000 for African-American households and just over $80,000 for whites), leaving little money available for intergenerational wealth transfers.
Thus, while at first blush, increasing homeownership rates combined with increasing default rates in the 1990s might seem to be evidence for a story here of expanding homeownership by making facially riskier subprime loans, some of which fail but others of which do not, a careful look at the data does not support this view. To the contrary, homeownership rates would have increased more during the 1990s, absent the loss of homeownership caused by predatory refinancings and second mortgages.
worst thing a lender could do if they missed several monthly payments, did not come up with foreclosure or loss of the home as an answer. 41 Although these respondents certainly knew that foreclosure was a possibility, this risk was not something they consciously contemplated in connection with their loans. Among those with overly risky predatory loans, the disproportionate prevalence of the elderly, who display a higher degree of risk aversion generally in psychological studies, would indicate that consumer desire for risk-taking is unlikely to be driving the increase in risky loans and the increase in foreclosures. No lender tells borrowers how much risk the borrower is taking on; although in the last couple of years, consumers have been given greater access to their own credit reports and credit scores, 42 a consumer has no means to translate a credit report or score into a statement about her own probability of default on a particular loan without access to proprietary information and models held by lenders. In 1994, after hearing testimony from and about borrowers who had lost their homes to foreclosures, Congress passed a statute, the Home Owners Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), requiring that high cost loan borrowers be told in writing that they could lose their homes if their loans are not paid. Regardless of the efficacy of such a disclosure, discussed further below, Congress's passage of legislation requiring it demonstrates that Congress found that some consumers do not adequately consider the risk of foreclosure when borrowing.
The HOEPA risk of foreclosure disclosure is typical of current federal home loan regulation. With the removal of the constraints on price and risk of foreclosure previously created by usury laws, the remaining law governing home loans is primarily a disclosure regime. Implicit in this form of regulation is the premise that borrowers are, or enough of them to make it economically rationally for loan sellers to treat them as if they were, financially-knowledgeable wealth maximizers, competent and motivated to comparison shop for credit and alternatives to credit by searching for, reading, understanding, and using information. The disclosure regime admits of some boundedness to consumer rationality -if borrowers were unboundedly rational and the market perfectly competitive then there would be no need for the government to intervene in the market by requiring disclosures at all -but the regime assumes that the main correction the market needs is informational. The informational fix assumes that consumers will make self-interested, well-informed, rational probabilistic financial choices, and in particular, that they will not agree to take a loan: (a) if a cheaper one can be found at a tangible search cost that does not exceed the difference in price, and (b) if a reasonable projection of their future income stream indicates that they will not be able to afford to make the prospective payments, and the probable losses to the borrower from foreclosure are greater than the cost of alternatives benefit is the feelings the customer will get with our loan. The minimum risk is what locks the customer.' and 'Keeping the loan. The customers must feel this loan is risk free for them.'" Excerpt from FAMCO loan officer training materials, reconstructed from testimony of Gene Marsh. at p. 12, Lines 22-25 (on file with author).
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Page 13 to obtaining the loan. In reality, for significant numbers of borrowers, neither assumption holds. The rational homo economicus model of individual decisionmaking, when stated as more than a nonfalsifiable postulate that people's actions reveal their rational choices, assumes that the decisionmaker will choose the option that will maximize her expected utility. This means engaging in a total cost-benefit analysis of the outcome expected from each alternative in the choice set, and then choosing an alternative based on a total weighted assessment of net costs and benefits. The thicker versions of rational choice theory would add that people make marketplace decisions based on their own financial self-interest. The homo economicus model, in its most traditional form, assumes that people are motivated to and able to price shop, that they will costlessly observe and evaluate all potential alternatives with reference to a pre-existing set of internal preferences, and that when they at first do not understand an attribute such as price, they will costlessly obtain the necessary information to understand the attribute.
A string of acronyms -TILA, RESPA, and HOEPA -forms the core federal law of home loans: the Truth-in-Lending Act 44 (TILA), the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
45
(RESPA), and the Home Owners Equity Protection Act 46 (HOEPA). The model upon which these statutes are based embraces the thicker conception of rational choice theory, but with a more realistic conception of consumer decisionmaking; while it admits people are not unboundedly rational, and thus need the assistance of disclosures due to prohibitive information search costs, it also assumes that they will, once given that financial information, use it to choose whether and which loan to take based on a rational calculus of their own financial self -interest 43 In general terms, much of what is described here is equally applicable to other types of consumer credit, such as credit cards, payday loans, auto financing, and rent-to-own arrangements, all of which have been criticized for predatory deployments. Federal law governing all forms of consumer credit is based on the wealth-maximizing rational economic actor model, and real world evidence undermines the applicability of this model to vast segments of the borrower markets for all forms of consumer credit. The suggestions here for bringing the law governing the home loan borrowing process into alignment with real consumer behaviors, and reining in the manipulation of those behaviors by sellers of credit, can be tweaked to apply to these other forms of consumer credit as well. Examining home loan borrowing merely provides a focused look at one site where the effects of the current gulf between the law's model of homogenous borrower behavior and real heterogeneous borrower behaviors has particularly pernicious effects. (or the self-interest of their families). The legal model of decisionmaking recognizes that, due to a lack of comprehension, an unwillingness to incur the necessary search costs, 47 and/or information overload, 48 consumers may fail to accurately extract price information from a stack of loan documents full of complicated and nonstandardized terms conveyed in arcane legal vocabulary. The disclosures are intended, on the price side of the decision, to put the crucial price information on a few sheets of paper in a standardized way, such that consumers can understand the price of the loan, and can comparison price shop.
RESPA is aimed at helping borrowers price shop for settlement services. It requires lenders and brokers to give most home loan borrowers information about a plethora of settlement costs, including origination fees, points, and broker fees that will be charged to the borrower upfront, charges imposed by third parties such as appraisal or title insurance fees, and amounts the borrower must escrow for taxes and property insurance. Prior to settlement, these disclosures are given on a good faith estimate ("GFE"), in which the figures may be expressed as a range of estimated dollar values. At closing, these figures must be disclosed in a statement of actual settlement costs, typically listed on the settlement sheet (the uniform settlement statement or "HUD-1"). Section 8 of RESPA prohibits unearned kickbacks and referral fees, such as payments by third party settlement services providers to lenders or from lenders to brokers for referring borrower business. The anti-kickback provision is an implicit recognition that the disclosures alone will not always lead to price shopping, at least not when the lender and settlement providers collude.
TILA requires creditors to give borrowers a single page, standardized format disclosure that includes:
(a) the annual percentage rate ("APR") of the loan, intended to express the total annual cost of borrowing, including interest and other scheduled charges and fees imposed by the broker, lender, and related entities, such as origination fees and points; 49 (b) the finance charge, a dollar figure expressing the total cost of borrowing charged by the broker, lender, and related entities; (c) the amount financed, meaning the proceeds of the loan and certain charges and fees, typically those imposed by third parties, when these are financed; (d) the total of all payments that will be made on the loan, including principal, interest, and other charges and fees; (e) the number and amount of monthly loan payments, exclusive of taxes and insurance, and the amount of any balloon; (f) the amount of any late charge; (g) whether credit insurance is required and at what price; and (h) whether a borrower "may" or "will not" have to pay a prepayment penalty if she pays the loan off early.
TILA is aimed at helping borrowers understand the price of credit, to facilitate price shopping for loans.
To further facilitate price shopping, HOEPA requires additional disclosures for high cost closed-end (meaning a lump sum loan, not a line of credit) non-purchase money home loans.
50
These include:
(a) the APR, (b) the monthly payment amount, (c) for variable rate loans (adjustable rate mortgages or "ARMs") the maximum monthly payment possible under the contract, (d) the amount of any balloon, and (e) a statement that the applicant is not required to complete the transaction even though she has signed the application.
HOEPA was passed in response to predatory lending, and is intended to provide high cost loan consumers with disclosures that will encourage price shopping.
51 HOEPA, using high interest rates and fees as a proxy for decisionmaking impediments, 52 recognizes that consumers who agree to high cost loans may mistakenly believe that they are obligated to take the loan at whatever price is quoted once they have signed the application. HOEPA also substantively prohibits adding unfavorable terms -interest rate escalations triggered by borrower default, balloons on loans shorter than five years, negative amortization, and some prepayment penalties -to high cost loans. In effect, this prevents lenders from "piling on," i.e., heaping unfavorable terms, terms that can exact quite a price from borrowers, onto borrowers from whom a high price is already being exacted. 53 HOEPA thus recognizes that those consumers who have agreed to loans with high rates and fees may not fully take account of the price implications 54 of 50 Currently, a high cost loan under HOEPA is defined as one with: (a) an APR of more than eight percentage points above the yield on Treasury securities of comparable maturities, or (b) points and fees, including mortgage broker fees but excluding other third party charges, that exceed eight percent of the loan amount or the current equivalent of $400 1994 dollars, whichever is greater. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32. 51 HOEPA's provisions are also intended to discourage taking risky loans, as discussed further below.
52 Or perhaps bad luck, as other consumers may suffer the same impediments yet not have had the misfortune to be offered a loan on such high rate and fee terms.
prepayment penalty and default interest rate escalation provisions when making the loan decision.
The federal statutes also have a number of timing requirements. The GFE under RESPA must be given within three days of receipt of a borrower's application. For a non-purchase money home loan, the TILA disclosures must be given at closing, or the day before where the borrower so requests. For high cost loans, the additional HOEPA disclosure must be given three days before closing. The timing requirements for these written disclosures recognize that, either due to a lack of understanding on the borrowers' part, or oral gamesmanship on the sellers' part, consumers may fail to demand and receive complete price information from sellers of loans before accepting the loan. However, the law assumes that once consumers receive the correct information through disclosures, their home loan decisions will reflect their own priceminimizing and wealth-maximizing self-interested choices. 55 American Equity Mortgage is not a small or fringe institution. As its website touts: " [W] e are one of the leading mortgage bankers in the country, and we have been providing financial solutions that help thousands of homeowners get back on track every year. We have a variety of programs for debt consolidation, refinancing, and purchases, which allows us to help almost anyone. Even if you have had credit problems, we can put together a program to meet your needs. Through our award-winning customer service and strong advertising, we have established ourselves as an industry leader. You can trust American Equity Mortgage to provide you with the best possible service, now and in the future. And with our state of the art software, we make the process fast and easy." www.americaneqmtg.com/about.htm. It originated over $1.3 billion in loan volume in 2002, and has won various awards. See, e.g., www.americaneqmtg.com/CAAEM.pdf .
How the Law Fails to Meet Its Own Decisionmaker Model

I am a senior citizen and I am working. I was substitute teaching… But because of retirement ages for teachers, I am now working as a secretary, which I find to be an interesting and challenging occupation as well. I first heard about American Equity Mortgage 55 in August 2000… According to the loan officer at American Equity Mortgage, even though I wanted a home equity loan to pay off some bills and do some minor home improvements, it was in my best interest to do a consolidation, which meant refinancing my old mortgage loan. The mortgage loan officer of American Equity
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Current law does not ensure that consumers will engage in informed price shopping that will result in competitive home loan pricing at marginal lender cost levels, even accepting the decisionmaker model presupposed by current law. First, federal law does not cover all home loans, the legal fix for which needs no explanation. Next, borrowers do not understand even the current disclosures, in part due to lack of financial literacy. Current legal rules recognize consumers' inability to comprehend underlying loan documents, but fail to recognize that the same problem infects the responses of some borrowers to the disclosures themselves. For example, regarding loan price disclosures, only ten percent of respondents in a survey of recent home loan borrowers understood the concept of APR well enough to accurately answer whether the APR is higher, the same, or lower than the note or contract interest rate, fewer than would have correctly guessed the answer by chance. 57 The disclosures are not presented in simple enough lay terms, and many borrowers, encouraged by loan sellers to do so, ignore the disclosures as incomprehensible legally-mandated gobbledygook.
Third, other than the GFE, none of the disclosures are provided early enough in the process to truly facilitate price shopping, even under the current law's assumption that borrowers will try to use the information provided to make the loan decision. The law recognizes that consumers need written price disclosures to make a decision, yet then fails to give them the disclosures until a point in time when, as both a practical matter and as a matter of decisionmaking psychology, many consumers will not be in a position to price shop. Without shopping, consumers have no reference points for evaluating the price disclosed and making an informed decision. The TILA and HOEPA disclosures are provided for purchase money loans and for high cost refinancings and second mortgages only three days before closing. Although with automated underwriting, the loan approval and pricing decision can be fairly quick in the prime market, in the subprime market typically more borrower information 58 must be collected and analyzed before a lender will make a pricing decision, meaning that three days is not enough time to obtain competing loan price offers. 59 For refinancings and second mortgages that fall 58 In the predatory market, this borrower information could include information about whether the borrower is likely to be exploitable, willing to accept a loan at a higher price than risk and cost to the lender would dictate.
below the HOEPA triggers, the only required written disclosure of the APR and finance charge need be given until closing, after which all the borrower has to use for price shopping purposes is the three day right of rescission, not a realistic shopping window. Psychologically, the borrower will typically be in a decisionmaking mindset or "frame" 60 only until she completes the application or receives informal price information such as an estimated monthly payment amount; at three days before closing through three days after closing she is likely to be in a postdecisional implementation frame, and will be motivated to justify, but not revise, her prior decision.
61
HOEPA recognizes something close to this phenomenon for high cost loan borrowers, and gives them a disclosure explaining that they are not obligated to accept a loan once they have signed the application. While, as explained below, the disclosure itself is largely ineffective, there is no reason to think this misperception affects only high cost borrowers, yet the law does not require that this corrective information to be given to other borrowers.
Fourth, some of the disclosures do not include all the information needed to price shop. The GFE is not hard and fast, and in some cases lenders, not being subject to any legal liability for failure to prepare an accurate GFE, disclose a range of potential settlement costs rather than the specific prices that will be charged, such that consumers cannot truly rely on the GFE to shop for settlement services. Motivated reasoning 62 would also be likely to cause consumers to focus on the lower end of the range, giving lenders an incentive to low-ball their estimates. The APR does not allow for accurate comparisons of total loan costs, because it excludes the price of title insurance and application, appraisal, and document preparation fees, all of which are part of the true cost of credit.
63 Moreover, it is only accurate if the borrower holds the loan to term, or if the entire price is charged through interest, both unlikely scenarios. The prepayment penalty statement on the TILA disclosure is opaque, stating only that the loan "may" result in a prepayment penalty, but without any explanation that refinancing the loan is the equivalent of physically too late. And in any case, such competing offers would not necessarily be binding, because the GFE needs only to be an estimate, and can be disclosed as a range. 61 Accord HUD-Treasury Report, supra n. 7 at 65 ("Currently, consumers receive the GFE within 3 days after application [,] after they have paid an application fee and are committed to a loan provider."). 62 See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108:3 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 481-82 (1990) (reviewing evidence of motivated reasoning phenomenon). 63 All figures on the TILA and early HOEPA disclosure exclude the cost of credit insurance where credit insurance is not "required" by the lender. The problem with this is that lenders frequently slip credit insurance into loans such that borrowers perceive it to be required, and to be part of the price they must pay for credit, yet it is not included in the disclosed aspects of loan price. This is particularly problematic in the case of single premium credit insurance, a product that, where financed, is significantly more expensive than monthly credit insurance premiums would be, particularly where the borrower does not hold the loan for the term of the insurance, with no additional benefit to borrowers, but with benefits to the lender of being able to collect interest on the financed premium.
repaying it, nor any indication of how much such a penalty will cost the borrower. 64 The failure to require a statement of the prepayment penalty amount reflects an underlying substantive issue -these penalties can be structured in so many ways, that no one uniform short disclosure can convey all the information needed to make a fully informed price decision. 65 Fifth, and in tension with the foregoing, even the current disclosures contain too much information, which poses both a process problem and a substantive problem. On the process side, the amount of information alone overloads consumers, regardless of whether it is buried in the documents or in a few dense sheets of paper, even though it is perhaps less overwhelming than it would be if presented as a stack of long legal documents without the disclosures. At a more substantive level, the reason the disclosures contain so much information is because borrowers need all of this information to make a fully informed decision, because the loans themselves are complexly structured. But understanding why this complexity is a problem requires moving beyond the law's model. 65 For example, prepayment penalties can be structured to vary over time, as a percentage of the remaining principal, or as a proportion of the as-yet-unpaid interest payment stream the lender had been hoping to receive. For such a loan, the disclosure of the prepayment penalty would have to contain quite a lot of information, none of which is well-understood by people with low financial literacy.
Beyond the Law's Decisionmaking Model
66 Paul D. Davies, Anything for a Deal, PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS (February 6, 2001) . 67 In laboratory experiments -ideal informational conditions not present in real world home loan decisionmaking in that (a) subjects are given information about all relevant attributes (and thus subjects have no search costs) and (b) that information is presented in a format that is easily understood and encoded (and thus subjects have low information processing costs) -subjects typically consider a maximum of five attributes (including price and quantity terms) of a product. attributes under consideration even more radically, to fewer attributes. 68 In the home loan context, a common heuristic is to use the monthly payment amount as the sole price assessment criterion. By reducing the loan to a single attribute, the consumer eliminates any less tangible, more uncertain, or more difficult to calculate loan attributes from the decision process. 69 The monthly payment is an easily understood attribute of the loan, one for which the borrower has available reference points of prior mortgage or rent payments.
70
Processing in Brand Choice, 6 J. CONSUMER RES. 154, 155 (1979) ; see also id. at 155 (noting that past research indicates that consumers consider only three brands and five attributes when making purchase decisions); id. at 162 (in product choice experiment, subjects usually reduced the number of brands considered to three or four, and then analyzed five or fewer attributes, even when information was readily available on other relevant attributes). Even given this restricted set of information, there appears to be significant heterogeneity among subjects in choice strategy, id. at 163, and in which and how many attributes are considered. 325-26 (1995) (in study of highly educated subjects, although subjects indicated that a complex compensatory decision strategy should be used, and that they wanted professionals to use such rules, they themselves chose to use simplifying strategies when making decisions).
68 Giora Keinan, Decision under stress: Scanning of alternatives under controllable and uncontrollable threats, 52:3 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 639, 642 (1987) . See also Noel Capon & Marian Burke, Individual, Product Class, and Task-Related Factors in Consumer Information Processing, 7:3 J. CONSUMER RES. 314, 324 (Dec. 1980) (finding in consumer choice experiment that low socioeconomic status (SES) subjects sought less information, ignored some choice alternatives, relied more on brand name, and even used less price information than mid/high SES subjects). 69 Relying on certain, well-understood choice attributes to make a decision while ignoring other attributes has been named the "evaluability bias. DECISIONMAKING, 107, 116-17 (1998) . 70 Unlike interest rate or APR, which are not mentally-available reference points for many borrowers, even those who have had previous home loans. One survey found that about ten percent of home loan borrowers admit that they do not know what their home loan interest rate is, even within a percentage point or two, and this probably significantly understates the true number who do not know their interest rate, because the survey did not check to see if the responses of borrowers who claimed to know their home loan's interest rate within a percentage point or two were correct. Fannie Mae, 2001 National Housing Survey 13 (Fannie Mae Foundation 2002 [hereinafter, 2001 NHS] . Borrowers were asked to report whether their home loan interest rate was less than 7 percent, between 7 and 8 percent, between 8 and 10.5 percent, between 10.5 and 12 percent, between 12 and 14 percent, or greater than 14 percent. Between 10 and 11 percent of respondents did not know where within these ranges their loan interest rate fell. Id.
Further, many borrowers use the monthly payment heuristic not to optimize the decision by finding the loan with the lowest monthly payment, but rather use the maximum monthly payment amount as a ceiling, and will accept the first loan they find under this ceiling. Although "satisficing" 71 in this way is motivated by a borrower concern about avoiding an unaffordable monthly payment and attendant risk of foreclosure, the result is that the broker or lender may sell the borrower the highest priced loan on the market that can be structured to meet the monthly payment satisficing heuristic. Similarly, the seller may offer a loan with a low initial monthly payment figure that meets the borrower's ceiling, but that increases over time. 72 Empirical study confirms the danger that borrowers who rely on monthly payment as a simplifying heuristic are vulnerable to price gouging. Using a multivariate regression analysis of the home loan search methods of prime and subprime borrowers, "borrowers whose search emphasized affordable monthly payments" were more likely to end up with a higher interest rate, subprime loan rather than a prime loan, even controlling for the cost and default risk profile presented by the borrower to the lender.
b. Cognitive Biases
A bias in decisionmaking is a failure to weight an aspect of the decision accurately. In the home loan decision, consumers may underweight the total price of the loan not only by relying exclusively on the monthly payment heuristic, but also due to common cognitive biases. For example, time discounting or myopia, a common bias causing an underweighting of events in the future through an abstracted construal of the future event, 74 may affect price shopping. Some borrowers influenced by this bias would tend to underweight the future costs of the loan, such that in making the loan decision, a loan with monthly payments that go on for ten years might seem nearly the same as a loan with the same monthly payments extending for fifteen years. Similarly, mental "scaling" biases, including underweighting of large figures beyond the more everyday experience of the decisionmaker, 75 can cause some borrowers to underweight, or even fail to weight at all, the total finance charge on a home loan. The total finance charge is typically a figure in the tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars, a dollar figure that for some borrowers is beyond any figure with which the borrower has familiarity and facility in evaluating. 71 Simon, supra n. 47 at 114-15. 72 Loans with monthly payment increases are discussed in more detail in connection with risk, below. 75 See Stanislas Dehaene, THE NUMBER SENSE 76 (1997) ("The mental ruler with which we measure numbers is not graduated with regularly spaced marks. It tends to compress larger numbers into a smaller space. Our brain represents quantities in a fashion not unlike the logarithmic scale on a slide rule, where equal space is allocated to the interval between 1 and 2, 2 and 4, or between 4 and 8.").
Another cognitive bias is to overweight out-of-pocket sunk costs, due to the intersection of a number of psychological phenomena. 76 This may inhibit a borrower who has filled out an application and paid an application fee from rationally reconsidering her options, even when the loan she is subsequently offered and for which she receives price disclosures appears to be very expensive. Filling out the application and paying the fee may create a sense of commitment, because to decline the loan would imply that the original decision to pay the fee to this lender was incorrect. Rather than appear wasteful and incurring a certain loss of the application fee by declining the loan and seeking another lender, some consumers may be tempted to mentally overstate the positive aspects of the loan offered, and mentally understate the price apparent from the disclosures. This may inhibit price shopping because, although the application fee is usually in the fifty to two-hundred dollar range, a cost that could easily be more than compensated for by finding a loan with even a slightly lower interest rate than the one under consideration, that application cost may loom larger, and be overweighted in the decision whether to apply to multiple lenders so as to price shop.
c. Emotional Coping Mechanisms
The Power of Yes.
-Washington Mutual 77 _________________________________________________ Emotional coping mechanisms can interfere with decisionmaking by causing the decisionmaker to ignore or avoid emotionally threatening information.
78 For example, a borrower who wants to avoid the ego threat posed by repeatedly exposing her poor credit history in the loan application process -what one broker calls "the financial strip search" -could be 76 A decision is a point between two stages: a predecisional deliberation stage, in which one is still weighing alternatives, and an implementation stage, in which one perceives oneself as implementing a decision that one has made. See Liberman & Trope, supra n.60 at __. A decision is often subjectively experienced as a commitment, giving the decisionmaker an expectation of whatever benefits and burdens she knew would be entailed when she made the decision, thereby creating a new status quo reference point from the perspective of the endowment effect. Once someone has committed to something, she is often reluctant to change, and will not pause to reconsider her decision even when new information comes about during implementation that would cause her, if she were in the predecisional phase, to weigh options very differently. To change would imply that the original decision to commit was incorrect, and therefore poses an ego threat. Even without new information, the old information is reinterpreted in light of the commitment; subjects' probability of success estimates for an investment are higher after they have chosen the investment than before they have chosen it, even though the only new information they possess is their own decision. deterred from price shopping. 79 The data bear out a relationship between receiving a higher cost subprime loan, and failing to price shop. In the 2001 National Housing Survey, a third of all homeowners reported that they chose their lender based on the interest rate, whereas only eleven percent of subprime borrowers reported that this was why they chose their lender.
80 Subprime borrowers also report less search for the best interest rate they could obtain than prime borrowers -about a third of subprime borrowers yet half of prime borrowers report that they searched "a lot" for the best rate. 81 No money down and a quick decision were more frequently-cited by subprime borrowers than by borrowers overall as reasons for choosing a particular lender or broker.
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This avoidance coping mechanism will have a disparate impact on African-American consumers, because they have, on average, worse credit histories, and because they more frequently than whites misperceive themselves as having poor credit histories when their credit is good. According to a 1999 national survey, approximately fifty percent of African-American borrowers, and thirty percent of white borrowers, who had good credit believed they had poor credit.
83 Similarly, the fear of discrimination 84 causes some African-American and Latino borrowers to avoid potential discriminatory denial of credit by shopping based on "guaranteed approval" rather than attempting to obtain a loan from a prime lender that advertises low rates. (Sept 2, 1999) ). 84 One study found that as at 1992, 40% of African-Americans and 10% of whites in a major U.S. metropolitan area thought banks and lenders would "very often" not loan money to African-Americans, and another approximately 45% of African-Americans and 40% of whites thought banks and lenders "sometimes" would not loan money to African-Americans. Reynolds Farley, Racial Differences in the Search for Housing: Do Whites and Blacks Use the Same Techniques to Find Housing,?, 7:2 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 367, 381 (1996) . 85 Although the absolute numbers of borrowers who reported using this as their primary basis for decision was small, more than twice as many borrowers who have higher-cost subprime home loans than borrowers overall reported that they picked their lender based on the fact that the lender did not discriminate. 2001 NHS, supra n. 70 at 15. A recent industry focus group study of African-American and Latino recent purchase money home loan borrowers fleshes out these findings, and sheds some light on why even upper-income nonwhites are disproportionately likely to end up with subprime loans: A majority reported that they were not provided with, and did not seek, a variety of mortgage options:
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Page 24 The marketing campaigns of subprime lenders play on these emotional coping mechanisms, emphasizing "the power of yes" and the guarantee of approval, without advertising the interest rate or APR of the loans being offered. The fear of a loan denial, whether due to real or imagined credit history or discrimination, can lead consumers to quickly agree to any loan offer, regardless of price. Fannie Mae's 2001 National Housing Survey found that ten percent of all homeowners, and a third of all credit-impaired borrowers "did not care whether they received the lowest cost loan for which they were qualified. They were just happy to be approved for a mortgage." 86 B. How to Solve the Price Problem
Why the Market Will Not Solve the Price Problem
As is evident from the current lack of price advertising for subprime loans, 87 sellers know that price is not a top concern for significant market segments. More importantly, sellers benefit from keeping borrowers in the dark about subprime loan prices. Without reference points for what loan price to expect, subprime borrowers generally must rely on the loan prices given to them by the sellers, who know much more about what price would be available in the marketplace for that borrower's risk and cost profile. In a sense, adverse selection is turned on its head -the lenders are doing the adverse selection here, picking buyers who will generate the highest surplus to the lenders. The "informed minority" of super-rational borrowers has no effect on any of the terms a vulnerable borrower receives, because the benefit to the lender of setting individualized contract price terms outweighs the costs, and therefore lenders and brokers carefully differentiate among borrowers and price the loans offered to them based on not only the lender's costs, but also the borrower's vulnerability. By discriminating between informed superrational borrowers and vulnerable borrowers, lenders can sell more expensive and riskier loans to the latter. Further, because broker and loan officer compensation is tied to volume and markups (both interest rate markups, called "yield spread premiums," 88 and markups on other price [They] did not actually comparison-shop for the best terms for their mortgage. Many did not think such comparisons were possible. A substantial number were just happy to get a "yes" to their mortgage application, so they did not even consider the possibility of getting better terms for their mortgage. The few participants who considered multiple mortgage applications to permit closer comparisons were discouraged from doing this by the penalties associated with repeated requests for credit scores. 8-9 (2003) . Too many inquiries can reduce a credit score, because some credit scoring models view a number of closely-spaced inquiries as an indication that the consumer has been turned down for credit. components of the loan package, such as points, fees, and credit insurance 89 ), there are incentives for them to sell borrowers a larger loan than the borrower needs, at a higher price than otherwise available on the market.
Research Institute for Housing America, Insights into the Minority Homebuying Experience: The Mortgage Application Process
Why is there so little advertising of subprime and predatory loan prices? First, because loan products and their pricing today are simply too complicated for many borrowers to easily understand and use in decisionmaking. Borrower education is a public good, giving no one lender an incentive to provide it. The home loan borrowing process is not a frequently repeated game for most, giving consumers few opportunities to learn from the process, and leaving the likelihood of ending up at a maximizing decision strategy equilibrium nil. The heuristics, biases, and coping mechanisms that cause many borrowers to misunderstand, ignore, or fail to sufficiently weight aspects of the price of a home loan, have generally been found to be very stable and resistant to change. No lender or broker will find it in its interest to advertise and then offer low prices to vulnerable borrowers, because these borrowers will accept higher prices. Although anticipation that borrowers with overpriced loans will refinance elsewhere could lead to interest rate competition, 90 it will not lead to competition over prices for prepayment penalties or up-front fees, which in this market can be the lion's share of the price. Average origination fees in the prime market are between one and one and a half percent, but predatory lenders have been known to charge fees (typically financed into the loan) of twenty-five percent.
Second, even a competitive pricing structure for subprime loans will result in a range of prices according to the cost and risk presented by each borrower and loan. Such prices can not be effectively advertised, because there are no generic standards defining which borrower qualifies for which price, and the formulae are too complicated and too quickly evolving for the information to be transmitted in an advertisement from which a borrower might identify which price she would qualify for from a particular lender. No lender will find it in its interest to assist borrower shopping by giving the borrower complete price information about the loan offer early in the process, long before closing, because that would only open up the possibility that the borrower will find a cheaper loan elsewhere. This is not to say that there are no subprime borrowers who shop; the A-minus market is actually becoming more competitive, apparently due to price shopping by a segment of subprime borrowers. But other segments of this market are In fact, from the credit insurance premiums that a branch sold, they received 35% commission if Accident & Health or Involuntary Unemployment Insurance, and 30% commission if for credit life insurance. All of the ancillary products -which included something called Home and Auto -are worth 40% commission back to the branch."). 90 However, subprime refinancings do not appear to be very responsive to interest rates. Although prime refinancings mirror market rate changes, subprime refinancing activity is fairly flat, driven by cash-out refinancings rather than by rate refinancings. OCC Working Paper, supra n. 15 at 11; see also Cutts & Van Order, supra n. 7 at Fig 1 ( graphing prepayment rate data for prime and subprime loans against 30-year fixed mortgage prime interest rate). unwilling, unable, and/or unmotivated to price shop. The veneer of objectivity and legality that currently imbues the borrowing process 91 lulls a surprising number of borrowers into the mistaken belief that all lenders are required to give them the lowest loan price for which they qualify, and these borrowers therefore see no reason to price shop. 92 
Simplification of Loan Products to Achieve Meaningful Transparency Through
Simple, Timely Disclosures
The overpricing issue probably can, and, in light of the volatility of financial conditions and the mutability of loan price terms, certainly should, be regulated primarily with a "framing" focus, rather than through price controls. Substantive limits on loan prices are not an appropriate remedy for the problem of overpriced loans first because loan instruments are so malleable that any limit on one aspect of price can be evaded through restructuring the loan. Second, the price of home loan money will vary with many macroeconomic factors over time, such that an absolute limit could constrain appropriately priced lending when interest rates rise. Third, even if an indexed rate were chosen as a price limit, some loans at high prices in comparison to indexed rates can be appropriately priced, depending on the specific situation; for example, a small loan would, due to the cost of making and servicing the loan, be appropriately priced at a rate higher than the indexed rate.
Instead, home loans need to be simplified and standardized, and disclosures need to be provided earlier in the process, such that the vast majority of home loan borrowers will be enabled and encouraged to effectively price shop. The existing TILA and RESPA disclosures made some sense in a world of fairly simple uniform loan products. But in today's marketplace of loans with multifarious complex structures, the disclosures have become encrusted with layer upon layer of additions to meet each new complexity in the product. As a result, too many different dimensions of the loan must be examined by the borrower for many to make a fully rational decision. We need to move back to simpler and more standardized loan products, because only easily understood pricing, in conjunction with the disclosures that make that pricing easily observable early in the process, can lead to effective price shopping.
My preliminary proposal, for home loans other than purchase money loans, 93 would be to: 91 The loan price seems objective because it is presented as "this is the loan for which you qualify, according to our computer modeling of your credit report, based on objective facts about your credit history." It seems legallysanctioned at every turn, from the ream of government disclosures and loan documents filled with legalese, to the closing run by a formally independent settlement officer. 93 Purchase money loans tend not to be predatory, as explained above. Because more creative financing may be legitimately needed and reasonable to get someone into a home purchase, and because creative loan structuring tends to be predatory only in the non-purchase money market, my price proposal would not apply to purchase money loans. Pure rate refinancings -refinancings where the total finance charge remaining to be paid on the old loan exceeds the total finance charge to be paid on the new loan plus any prepayment penalty -might also be exempted from my proposal. Not only are pure rate refinancings not predatory, but they could be constrained by the timing provisions of my proposal, explained below.
(a) provide a simplified price shopping disclosure to the borrower early in the shopping process;
(b) substantively limit the structure of these loans such that the simplified disclosure would provide all the information needed to price shop; and (c) bring the market to the borrower to facilitate price shopping through a centralized process through which lenders could submit competing loan offers to borrowers.
The simplified disclosure would have to be given to the borrower before the borrower has sunk anything greater than minimal application fee costs into the process, such as a $50 application fee. The idea is to give the borrower a tool to use to shop at a time when the borrower is still in a decisionmaking frame, rather than at the implementation stage. The disclosure should be made no later than one week after application and three weeks before closing, so that the borrower has enough time to effectively price shop before becoming psychologically committed to the loan. The disclosure should instruct the borrower to use it to comparison price shop among lenders, and warn the borrower that the loan she is being offered may be overpriced. Failure to provide the disclosure would nullify the mortgage or result in a comparable deterrence-aimed penalty, such that the holder of the loan in the secondary market would have an incentive to police the originating lender and broker.
The disclosure would contain only four loan terms, few enough attributes that most borrowers could effectively use them in decisionmaking. These attributes would be:
1. total loan proceeds, 2. total up-front fees, points, and costs (whether financed or not financed and whether charged by a third-party or by the lender), 3. maximum monthly payment, and 4. loan length in years.
94
The tolerances for estimates on the disclosures should be very narrow, such that the lender can not disclose a broad range of possible prices or a low-balled price. The first three figures would be expressed as a dollar amount, because consumers generally understand whole dollar figures better than percentages. The up-front cost figure would include every kind of fee and cost, including single premium credit insurance and similar products bundled into loan packages, such that the total up-front fee figure added to the total loan proceeds figure would sum to the total loan amount. The maximum monthly payment figure should probably include principal, interest, taxes, and insurance (PITI), as the borrower must budget for that total, a concern on the risk side of the problem discussed below. By disclosing only the maximum monthly payment, and not the initial monthly payment, hidden interest rate and monthly payment increases would no longer be advantageous, because the maximum monthly payment would be 94 People are more familiar with and have better facility with an expression of long time periods in years, rather than TILA's current disclosure of the loan period in months (i.e., people understand what is meant by a "20 year" loan better than a"240 month" loan).
the disclosed monthly payment the borrower would use to price shop. 95 These four attributes are few enough, and concrete enough, for most borrowers to use in comparison price shopping among loans.
For the simplified disclosure to enable price shopping, the four attributes disclosed must fully reflect the price of the loan. Therefore, balloons and negative amortization would be prohibited, because these would not be reflected in the above figures. 96 While it would be possible to craft an exception for balloons and negative amortization in situations where the borrower has a reasonably certain reason for expecting to be able to pay the balloon when it comes due, and from sources other than another mortgage (e.g., maturing trust fund, plans to sell house), any exception creates opportunities for deception for unscrupulous lenders. Similarly, prepayment penalties would not be permitted, because these would not be reflected in the above disclosure.
97 By structuring loans in simpler and fairly standardized ways, loans could be meaningfully compared through examination of these few features. By simplifying the loan pricing mechanism and the disclosure documents, the home loan decision process would be reframed to require consideration of only a limited number of loan attributes to make meaningful price comparisons between loans, thus facilitating price shopping.
These are not merely process solutions; by requiring loans to be structured in simplified and standardized ways, some choice narrowing will follow. This will involve some costs, because some complexly structured non-purchase money loans that are not predatory will be eliminated by these changes. There is no way to perfectly disaggregate predatory and nonpredatory uses of some loan products, absent a pricing suitability standard applied on a case-bycase basis in the courts or an administrative body, 98 a costly and probably infeasible solution.
99
On the one side is the harm caused by overpriced loans, including inefficiencies, money spent capturing rents, and regressive income redistribution. On the other is the benefit of the availability of complex loan products such as balloons, negative amortization, and escalating monthly payments to allow borrowers to more completely leverage their equity and to tailor their loan payments to their projected income stream, where that income stream is increasing. On balance, particularly in light of widespread uniformity of prime loan terms, it seems that the harm that will be avoided will outweigh the harm caused by these proposals. 100
Bringing Price Competition to the Borrower
The simplified price shopping disclosure described above could be even more useful to borrowers if, once one lender had given the borrower a loan offer in the form of the disclosure, other lenders came to the borrower with competing offers, the terms of which were disclosed in the same simplified format. To bring price competition to the borrowers, I propose that a government agency, perhaps the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), set up a method to facilitate such competition. A possible regulatory scheme would be for the agency to act as a neutral "bidding agent" linking borrowers and lenders. The first lender to give a borrower an offer would simultaneously transmit the simplified disclosure, along with all pertinent borrower and loan information, to the bidding agent. The information transmitted would consist of anything and everything the lender used to determine its offer, including the application and supporting documentation, appraisal, and credit score details. The agent would post the offer and supporting materials on the internet, at a website accessible only to lenders. Lenders would then submit competing bids to the bidding agent, who would transmit them to the borrower during the three-week window. Competing lenders would have to pay an administrative fee to the bidding agent and a finder's fee to the first lender, to cover the first lender's costs of searching for the borrower and qualifying the borrower 99 A suitability standard would pose numerous hurdles: the borrower must realize the loan was overpriced and initiate litigation; enforcing the standard would consume significant judicial or administrative resources in determining the "correct" price for the loan; and a standard rather than ex ante disclosure rules is more difficult to use in passing liability on to the secondary market. Similar obstacles weaken enforcement of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act's nondiscrimination standard in the lending arena, and prevent fraud claims and unconscionability doctrine from effectively policing home loan pricing. Only a process that holds the secondary market liable such as the proposal I have set forth here can work, because otherwise that market will have a holder in due course defense to liability. Placing liability on the brokers or originating lenders alone will not work, because they can set up shop and move at will. But by placing liability on the secondary market, they will have a reason to police the brokers, for example through significant bonding requirements. Bondsmen are unlikely to bond fly-by-nighters, and these brokers will then be driven out of business. 100 In addition to these simplification solutions to borrower decisionmaking difficulties, the special situation of refinancing an existing mortgage at a higher interest rate or with additional costs and fees and yet no net benefit to the borrower should be addressed. A procedural framing solution would be to require lenders to disclose not only the price figures for the new refinanced loan, but also to disclose the price figures for the additional proceeds, if any, alone. The disclosure would thus be the amount of proceeds above the amount being refinanced, the amount of upfront costs and fees being charged on the additional funds being borrowed, the increase in monthly payment amount, and the additional length added to the loan, if any. Some experimentation would be required to determine whether borrowers would effectively use such information. Another possibility would be to substantively prohibit lenders from refinancing any home loan where the resulting loan has an APR higher than the note interest rate on the existing loan (because the non-interest components of the existing loan's APR will have already been paid by the borrower, the note rate is the appropriate comparison figure) .
for the loan. The borrower would be free to accept the original offer or any competing bid, and the competing bids would not have to go through the same posting and bidding process.
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Such a system would require careful monitoring by the agency. Regulations would be needed to prevent gaming of the system, such as the first lender failing to make all information available to other lenders or engaging in side deals with borrowers, or the competing lenders going directly to the borrower rather than paying the finder's and administrative fees. Calibrating the right size finder's fee would also be difficult, because too high a fee would result in too few competing bids, and too small a fee would make it unprofitable for the first lender to search for and qualify some borrowers. Because those borrowers who require the greatest assistance from the lender to qualify tend to be low and moderate income borrowers with less established and documented credit history, the finder's fee might need to be larger for these borrowers. But if the system worked, then at equilibrium very few competing bids would be made, because the first lender would have a stronger incentive than currently exists to give the borrower a competitive price.
Through a system of early, simplified price disclosures and active price competition, the power to price shop would be placed in the hands of the borrower, and true autonomy of consumer decisionmaking would be achieved. The out of pocket sunk costs of the time, fee, and effort required to submit multiple applications to various lenders that discourage price shopping in the current market would no longer be a barrier to receiving competing loan offers. Although fear of the financial strip search and of a loan denial due to poor credit history or discrimination would continue to lead borrowers to apply to the lender who advertises a guaranteed yes, that lender would no longer have a lock on the applicant. Real price competition would displace the current problems of rent seeking by lenders, price inefficiency, and regressive income redistribution from lower income (and disproportionately African-American and Latino) borrowers to lenders.
IV. The Risk Side
A. Impediments to Good Decisionmaking About Risk
The Rational Actor Decisionmaker Model & The Decisionmaker Model Envisioned by the Law
As explained above, the traditional model of rational choice theory posits that people make decisions so as to maximize wealth or expected utility. They do so by evaluating all choice alternatives with reference to overall resultant states of well-being, by assessing these possible end-states in light of their own internal fixed orderings of preferences, and through basing their assessments on directly probabilistically weighted evaluations of uncertain outcomes. In the 101 The model here is similar to the service provided to prime borrowers through the on-line home loan broker LendingTree, but which is currently unavailable to subprime borrowers, because LendingTree does not arrange for loans to true subprime risk borrowers. Even if a subprime LendingTree were to be created, many borrowers at risk for experiencing predatory lending would be unable to effectively use such a service, both because they fall on the other side of the digital divide (that is, lack effective access to the internet), and because they lack the ability to gather the paperwork and accurately extract and submit the detailed information required for a subprime lender to make a firm loan offer.
context of home loans, this model would mean that borrowers know their own risk preferences, that they are able to discern the risk of loss of equity and foreclosure presented by a loan, and that they will choose the loan or alternative to taking a loan that maximizes their own wealth or utility, trading off the benefits to be derived from each loan or other alternative against the price and risk posed by the loan or alternative to arrive at an optimal decision.
The decisionmaker model underpinning the federal law of home loans recognizes a degree of boundedness to borrower rationality when it comes to risk of foreclosure, although as with price, it attempts to deal with this boundedness primarily through disclosure. First and most importantly, the monthly payment figure provided on the TILA and HOEPA disclosures is an indirect but, at least in cases where the monthly payment will not rise, very effective disclosure for many borrowers about risk. The vast majority of borrowers attempt to use, frequently quite successfully, the monthly payment figure to determine the affordability, and thus implicitly the risk, of the loan. Further, the specific TILA and HOEPA disclosures of balloon terms, which can be very risky because a borrower must be able to pay off the large balloon payment at once, are a recognition that the existence of a balloon might not be salient from the underlying loan documents. As with price disclosures, risk disclosures implicitly posit a model of consumers who may have difficulty extracting risk information from loan documents, due to lack of comprehension, an unwillingness to incur the necessary search costs, or information overload. The disclosure model further assumes that once borrowers are provided with the risk information, they will use that information to make an optimal decision about whether to incur that risk or to choose an alternative to taking the loan.
HOEPA further uses high cost of loan both as an indicator of high risk, and as a proxy for borrower vulnerability, and for these loans requires a disclosure statement that the borrower could lose the home if the loan is not paid, and disclosure of the maximum amount of the monthly payment where that amount may change. The model of the borrower here is one who lacks a complete comprehension of the mortgage instrument both as to foreclosure and as to potential monthly payment amounts, or who may be unduly confident that foreclosure will not occur and the monthly payment amount will not rise, or unwilling to admit that a foreclosure might occur. These reactions to the possibility of foreclosure and the possibility that the monthly payment may increase could be caused by persistent heuristics, biases, and coping mechanisms, such as the availability and representativeness heuristics, overoptimism, loss aversion, and motivated reasoning or confirmatory bias, discussed further below. HOEPA even recognizes that this warning may be ineffective in the face of these heuristics and biases; HOEPA provides some at least theoretical protection for borrowers who are not assisted by the warning, through prohibiting lenders from engaging in a pattern of extending high cost loans without regard to the borrower's ability to pay from sources other than home equity.
Similarly, HOEPA provides some substantive limits on risky terms for high cost loans by prohibiting balloons shorter than five years, negative amortization (which, in effect, creates a balloon due at the end of the loan term), and interest rate increases triggered by default. These substantive restraints on loan terms reflect an understanding that high cost loan borrowers need protection from the risk created by short-term balloons and negative amortization, and that where a borrower has already defaulted on the high cost loan, that borrower is especially in need of protection from interest rate escalations, as these would only increase the risk (through increasing the monthly payment amount) on a loan that has already proven to be too much for the borrower to entirely handle. HOEPA's substantive provisions implicitly acknowledge a very different decisionmaking model than posited by rational choice theory. The model here includes some borrowers who are unable use the disclosures provided to make good risk decisions for themselves, due to lack of comprehension and persistent heuristics, biases, and coping mechanisms that affect decisionmaking. equity in the home to cover a lender's losses in case of foreclosure, the higher than market value of the home to the owner provides an incentive to pay the loan back. Any loan the borrower can afford to pay out of income for even a short period of time is not made "without regard" to the borrower's ability to pay. All balloon loans, other than those scheduled to be due at a time when the borrower is expecting a large inflow of funds to pay the balloon, are most certainly made by the lender with an expectation that the borrower will pay the balloon out of home equity through refinancing. 22, 2003) . But due to accounting irregularities, it took a "$605 million write-off that stunned investors and triggered its bankruptcy in 1999," leading to liquidation in 2000. Id.
How the Law Fails to Meet Its Own Decisionmaker Model
I grew up in West Virginia
I began getting calls from people trying to refinance my mortgage all hours of the day and night. I received a letter from United Companies
106 Equity One is not a small or fringe lender. As stated on their web site: Equity One is a diversified consumer lending institution offering a complete line of real estate secured, home improvement and unsecured loan products. An affiliate of Popular Inc, a $33 billion company, Equity One has been in business over 12 years helping families and businesses all across the United States…. Come and experience the Equity One difference-honesty, fairness, and complete customer satisfaction. www.equityone.com/our_company.html. 107 Cityscape is a defunct lender that had trouble when its securitized loan pools started performing worse than investors had expected, including foreclosure rates of over ten percent without adequate collateral to cover losses. www.fool.com/DTrouble/1997/DTrouble971003.htm.
_________________________________________________
Even given its own implicit model of decisionmaking, the law does not do enough to ensure that consumers will engage in good decisionmaking about risk when it comes to determining which loan to take, or whether to take one at all. As with price-related information, many borrowers lack the financial literacy needed to make sense of the disclosures. For example, many borrowers do not know what a balloon is, and the balloon disclosure is therefore no more useful to them than a balloon term buried in the documents. Moreover, giving the borrower the bare information that the loan may result in foreclosure is likely to be useless. Borrowers already know that they could lose their homes if they do not pay the loan, so the risk disclosure is not really informing the borrower of anything, just highlighting the risk with the aim of increasing the weight the borrower places on risk in determining whether to take the loan. But a dry and abstract disclosure is unlikely to be enough to compel borrowers to weigh that information sufficiently into decisionmaking, because, as the substantive prohibitions in HOEPA implicitly recognize, common heuristics, biases, and coping mechanisms may interfere.
HOEPA's model of borrower decisionmaking counsels that all loans should be covered by HOEPA's regulations. There is no reason to think that borrowers of loans that are not high cost are not affected by some of the same heuristics, biases and coping mechanisms experienced by high cost loan borrowers. All consumers may fail to appreciate the potential for a rise in the monthly payment amount where there is a default rate escalation in the note.
Finally, HOEPA's recognition that disclosures may be ignored, misinterpreted, or insufficiently weighted, such that substantive limits on balloons on loans shorter than five years, negative amortization, and default interest rate increases are needed, calls for regulation not only of these three loan terms, but also of the risk posed by home loans more generally. A home loan without any of the features prohibited by HOEPA may pose too great a risk of default, for example due to an escalating 109 or variable monthly payment amount that could result in an unaffordable monthly payment, or an unaffordable balloon in year six. Any home loan borrower might fail to take these possibilities into account due to the heuristics, biases and coping mechanisms that HOEPA only very partially attempts to address. Quite a number of common decisionmaking heuristics may cause consumers to fail to recognize the risk posed by a loan, even in the face of disclosures. For example, the availability and representativeness heuristics may cause consumers to ignore foreclosure risk. The availability heuristic is the tendency to ignore statistical data in favor of estimating probabilities 109 Some loans are structured to have rising interest rates or otherwise rising monthly payment amounts at specific months or years in the repayment period. These are sometimes called graduated payment mortgages ("GPMs"), or are more generically referred to as ARMs. Although a traditional ARM is a mortgage with an interest rate that fluctuates only with an indexed rate, more complicated ARMs have been developed with interest rates that are scheduled to rise regardless of any indexed rate. HOEPA prohibits rate escalations triggered by default, but does not prohibit rate escalations built into the loan at specific months or years.
based on the mental "availability" -how easily the event is called to mind, whether due to personal experience or vividness of the image -of an event or occurrence.
110 Information regarding foreclosure is unlikely to be mentally available for most borrowers because there are few if any vivid portrayals of foreclosure in the media, and because someone who is foreclosed upon may experience shame and embarrassment about the financial and personal failure that foreclosure implicates, such that the person would be unlikely to advertise her experience of foreclosure. Without even second-hand experience or vivid images available to most borrowers, the risk of foreclosure is likely to be under-weighted or ignored in their decisionmaking. For HOEPA loans, the disclosure statement that the loan creates a mortgage and the borrower could lose her home if she fails to pay the loan is minimal and dry, and therefore likely to be underweighted in decisionmaking.
The representativeness heuristic is the tendency to evaluate the probabilities of an unfamiliar event or occurrence based on the degree to which it resembles other familiar events or occurrences, even where the probabilities of the events may bear no relationship to how similar the events seem.
111 A home loan borrower who has previous experience with a home loan, including the great majority of subprime borrowers and nearly all borrowers who receive predatory loans, 112 might, using the representativeness heuristic, conclude that the risk of foreclosure posed by the home loan being considered is about the same as the risk of foreclosure experienced by the borrower in prior loans. Unless this borrower has personally experienced foreclosure, the prior home loans would not appear to have been very risky, and so the borrower may underweight the risk of foreclosure posed by the new loan under consideration. 110 When making a decision involving a future contingency, people seem to need to form an internal perceptual image of the contingency and to experience an internal conscious or unconscious emotional response to that image in order to give that contingency sufficient weight in decisionmaking. Antonio Damasio, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 96-98 (1994) (discussing formation of perceptual images). These perceptual images can arise from any or multiple sensory modalities, not only vision. " [P] eople only care about the delayed or uncertain consequences of their decisions to the degree that contemplating such consequences evokes immediate affect." Loewenstein et al, supra n. 78 (citing sources and discussing evidence); see also Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics, J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (2005) (discussing evidence); Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L. J. 61, 71 (2002) ("When it comes to risk, a key question is whether people can imagine or visualize the worst-case outcome."). People therefore tend to ignore statistical data in favor of estimating probabilities based on the mental "availability" of an event or occurrence. 111 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra n. 109 at 4-7. In the consumer setting, the representativeness heuristic can lead to inferior learning by consumers with high prior knowledge of a type of product when they are presented with a new similar product, when the new product does not have significant cues that it is quite different from past products. Those consumers with prior knowledge learn less about the new product than consumers without prior knowledge, because those with high prior knowledge "incorrectly generalize from knowledge of existing products and assume that they already know how to use the new product properly." Stacy L. Wood & John G. Lynch, Jr., Prior Knowledge & Complacency in New Product Learning, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 416, 424 (Dec. 2002) . 112 Recall that subprime loans generally, and predatory loans particularly, are mostly refinancings or second mortgages obtained by homeowners who have previously had a purchase money mortgage and perhaps other refinancings or seconds.
http://law.bepress.com/alea/15th/art2 be low-level risks (and, although risk of foreclosure may be as high as twenty percent or more for some loan pools and classes of loans, on average the risk of foreclosure is still perceived to be a low level risk), the risk may be seen as unavoidable, and ignored out of necessity. The biases causing decisionmakers to discount risk, and overconfidently assume that they can manage the home loan presented, are overoptimism and the illusion of control.
117 Overoptimism and the illusion of control are a bias toward underweighting the risk of harm posed to oneself, even where one recognizes that the situation poses significant risk to others, due to a belief that one can control the situation and avoid the danger. Overoptimism and overconfidence appear linked to the availability and representativeness heuristics, in that people use past positive experiences of safety and memories of their own self-protective behaviors to estimate future susceptibility to harm. It also appears linked to motivations to avoid anxiety and to maintain self-esteem.
In the home loan context, overoptimism and the illusion of control are reflected in the testimony of borrowers who lost their homes at foreclosure. When they took the loan, many of these borrowers thought they "could manage" the loan, thought they would find the overtime hours or second job to make the payments, or thought they could tighten their spending on other expenses so as to have enough money each month to make the payments. Even when their ability to make the payments has more to do with the condition of the local economy and the availability of overtime, borrowers may misperceive that they can control their own income, and therefore overoptimistically believe they can ensure the loan payments will be made.
c. Emotional Coping Mechanisms
As on the price side, the common coping mechanisms of using denial and avoidance to deal with ego threats may impair some borrowers from making good risk decisions. Fear of discrimination or the ego threat posed by revealing past credit history may result in seeking any lender that offers guaranteed approval, regardless of both loan risk and loan price. A borrower may even affirmatively seek a higher loan amount than needed, viewing the extension of credit itself as a statement of not only amoral creditworthiness, but also a statement of trust from the lender and worth in society. To escape pressure from unsecured creditors and to avoid the ego threatening "deadbeat" label, borrowers may pay off unsecured creditors with secured home loan debt, ignoring the risk undertaken in the bargain. Rather than admitting the high risk of foreclosure that the loan may present, a risk that may threaten not only the borrower but also her highly unlikely events are either ignored or overweighted, and the difference between high probability and certainty is either neglected or exaggerated."); Sunstein, supra n. The problem on the risk side is that the risk assumed by borrowers is too high, given the borrowers' own preferences, the externalities caused by risky loans, and the choices borrowers would make in place of taking the loan if the borrowers fully understood the costs and benefits of the loan and of alternatives. Market mechanisms will not directly limit risk, 118 because the market using today's computer modeling tools can simply price risk rather than rationing credit to constrain risk. There is no mechanism by which the market would internalize the externalities caused by too much risk, such as concentrated neighborhood blight and long-term effects on society of families who become homeless. No market forces exist to motivate consumers to pursue, or even to inform consumers of, alternatives to risky loans, such as obtaining a less-risky loan, declaring bankruptcy, selling the home on the open market, 119 or foregoing the loan. In fact, unsecured creditors have every reason to encourage consumers who might otherwise declare bankruptcy, to obtain home loan debt to pay their unsecured debts, so that these creditors will not face charge-offs in bankruptcy. Reports have surfaced that companies with both credit card lending units and home loan lending units run credit card debtor data through models to predict who is likely to declare bankruptcy, and then target those at high risk of bankruptcy to convince them to refinance their dischargeable debt with home loan debt.
No lender in the market has an incentive to try to compete for borrowers by advertising low risk as a selling point on a home loan. By advertising low risk, the issue of risk is highlighted, and borrowers may associate risk, a negative product trait, more strongly with the lender doing this advertising, rather than ignoring risk, as many borrowers currently do. The lending industry as a whole has no incentive to undertake a home loan risk education campaign, because industry is currently profiting by selling risky loans. If consumers understood the risk levels of some of these loans, they might engage in more search for alternatives to the loans, and if consumers knew that there were alternatives to these loans they might borrow less, which would hurt the lending industry's bottom line.
Why Decision-Process Regulation Will Not Solve the Risk Problem
From a consumer psychology perspective, the two types of information the consumer is not adequately considering or weighing in the loan risk decision are the alternatives to the loan, and the risk of loss posed by the loan. As to the first, the problem with any disclosure that generically outlines the risks and benefits of the loan and alternatives to the loan, is that such a disclosure would present too much information for many borrowers to read, understand, encode, and use during the loan search process. In addition to posing lack of comprehension and information overload problems, generic information about these options will be ignored because many borrowers will not see the relevance of the information to their own loan decision. Specific information about the alternatives to the loan, tailored to each borrower's situation, would be quite costly for any lender to develop, and lenders will always have an incentive to downplay the risk from, and alternatives to, the loan the lender is selling.
Disclosing the level of risk presented by the loan is also not likely to be an effective way of facilitating rational loan risk decisionmaking, because borrowers are likely to either under-or overreact to the risk level disclosed. Pallid or abstract statistics about risk are unlikely to influence the choices of large segments of the population, due to the tendency to ignore dry data in favor of more available images of the concrete positive results the loan will bring. Even if the warning is vivid, if borrowers believe the risk level presented is low and/or unavoidable, they may treat the risk presented here as people frequently treat other low level risks such as health risks of smoking or driving -by ignoring the risk. On the other hand, a scary, salient messagefilm footage of families being evicted from the homes they lost to foreclosure, for examplealthough likely to make an impression, could over-deter potential borrowers from taking loans that are within reasonable risk bounds. That is, a scary warning could trigger a reaction in some borrowers akin to the reaction some people display towards airplane flight, and could over-deter some borrowers from taking loans that are in the borrowers' best long-run interests. The optimism of some academics 120 that a middle ground can be found for disclosures that neither under-nor over-deter risky but frequently socially desirable behavior is misplaced; the bimodal, poorly-calibrated behavioral response of most of the population to risk is well-established, and no warning will change that.
Moreover, different risk warnings are optimal for different segments of consumers, such that crafting a warning that reaches all segments may be impossible. The availability heuristic counsels that warnings must be vivid and dramatic to be easily brought to mind and thus to bear on decisionmaking. Yet the common coping mechanism of avoiding information in response to ego threat counsels in favor of positive imaging -messages along the lines of "To increase safety and happiness, take a low risk loan…" rather than the negative "danger" messages that would inhere in the vivid warning. Different mood states can affect decisionmaking such that even a single borrower may react to different warnings differently depending on mood.
Finally, even if we could fine-tune a warning message that resulted in loans at no more than a certain risk level, say risk level x, we would need to decide what risk level x should be, a societal decision illusive in many realms, including home loans. In the absence of a defined maximum level of acceptable risk, there is no way to know whether any particular warning disclosure has hit the optimal level of deterrence of overly risky loans. The legal scholars advocating "scary" warnings come close to recognizing this in their discussion of the malleability of preferences, yet they do not appreciate the extent to which this malleability means that the shaping of decisionmaking by the disclosures and the seller of the loan is inevitable. For risk of loss of home, there may be no foreclosure probability preference internal to each consumer waiting to be instantiated by free and informed consumer choice. There is only the risk level or levels we as a society decide or allow to reign, depending on whether we regulate the risk of home loans or allow the lending industry, in effect, to do so. Whether and when "people make choices that serve their best interests" is not only, as these scholars recognize, "a question to be answered based on evidence," 121 but a question that can be answered only with some substantive notion of what level of risk is in people's best interests. To say that the risk level in people's best interests is whatever risk people choose when "fully informed" is no more than the tautology of the thin version of rational choice theory (that decisions are utilitymaximizing) where, as here, we have reason to think that people fail to fully incorporate risk into their decisionmaking. We have no way to measure people's success at adequately weighting risk in their home loan decisionmaking apart from determining whether the decisions they arrive at after being given the risk information are, in fact, good decisions.
Defining & Enacting Enforceable Substantive Risk Limits
At both a normative and a conceptual level, defining reasonable, acceptable, or good levels of risk of foreclosure is very difficult, in part because we have not directly faced this issue in the past. To lay an outline of how we might start to define an acceptable risk level, there are at least two types of harm to consider in determining maximum acceptable risk levels: the injuries to the borrower and her household ("internalities"), and the injuries to her neighborhood or community ("externalities") caused by foreclosure.
Internalities caused by foreclosure include stress, instability, self-blame, and losses of housing (possibly homelessness), personal value in attachment to home, identity as a homeowner, a wealth-generating asset (due to appreciation and tax deduction for mortgage interest), a forced savings mechanism, equity (through inefficient foreclosure sales), and autonomous ability to shape one's own environment. These losses can mean the difference between feeling like a successful member of society who has achieved the American Dream of homeownership and an unsuccessful one. Studies of families prior to and after attaining homeownership have shown an increase in self-esteem, 122 which would presumably be lost after foreclosure. The literature on the benefits of homeownership also indicate that, controlling for parental and neighborhood characteristics, children have better scholastic and social outcomes when they live in homes owned by their families, and thus loss of homeownership would have negative effects on child outcomes.
123 But because predatory loans do not control for parents and neighborhood, but rather are more prevalent among low-income and minority borrowers, the internalities of foreclosure can be magnified by a lack of other financial and social supports.
Externalities caused by foreclosure include neighborhood instability and loss of positive externalities that flow from homeownership (greater community involvement and property investment and care levels by homeowners 124 ), especially for communities where foreclosures are concentrated. Externalities also can include the social costs of homelessness and the social costs of meeting basic human needs (medical care, education, retirement) that would otherwise be covered by home equity. Gross national statistics about foreclosure are in this regard less informative than neighborhood statistics; if foreclosures were spread evenly throughout this country's owner-occupied housing stock, they would have a negative impact on the particular families foreclosed upon, but would probably not create significant externalities. Because, however, predatory lending and resultant foreclosures are concentrated in low-income and minority urban and rural communities, they result in significant neighborhood negative externalities.
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Weighing these costs of risky loans resulting in foreclosure directly against the benefits of risky loans is probably impossible; we lack social consensus on how to measure the benefits of risky loans, 126 and we lack any way to quantify the risks and benefits, making it difficult to weigh them against one another. An easier and more relevant question might be what levels of risk are worth the benefits of a particular home loan instead of alternatives to that loan. Alternatives could include a smaller and less risky loan, a loan with fewer risky features (such as an amortizing loan rather than a balloon), bankruptcy with a homestead exemption, selling the 125 Historically, one potential period of concentrated foreclosure activity that, at a neighborhood level, may parallel the foreclosure activity found in some neighborhoods today, is the late 1970s. It was at that time that the foreclosure rates, while not terribly high compared to today's rates nationally, were relatively high within concentrated areas in a number of cities plagued by fraud in the Federal Housing Authority ("FHA") and Veteran's Administration ("VA") lending programs. FHA and VA loans are home loans to low-and moderate-income families and veterans. Under the FHA and VA loan programs, private lenders make these loans, but the government insures them, so as to bring down the cost to the lender and the price to the borrower of these loans through shifting the lender's risk of losses from any default to the government. If a borrower defaults on an FHA or VA loan and the lender forecloses on the property, a government insurance pool will pay the lender the principal remaining unpaid on the loan up to the insured principal amount, in exchange for the property. Although the programs permit lenders to make these loans only under specified conditions that demonstrate borrower creditworthiness, lenders have market incentives to make these loans, which are risk-free to the lender, without regard to creditworthiness, where HUD and the VA are not engaging in sufficient oversight to make sure the creditworthiness conditions are met. These foreclosures are not entirely parallel to the foreclosures of conventional (a loan that is not government-insured) subprime predatory loans today, because upon foreclosure, these homes went to HUD, a non-rational market actor that has historically failed to turn over foreclosed-upon and abandoned properties in its portfolio at the rates the private sector must to remain profitable. However, the negative neighborhood effects of these foreclosures are worth examining in trying to determine an appropriate maximum level of foreclosure risk for home loans today. 126 We might have some inkling of agreement that benefits vary depending on whether the proceeds are used to fund a small business, medical care, legal needs, education, or consumer purchases (and that as to the last, that very little risk of long-term loss of home would be worth the short-term benefits of most consumer credit uses).
http://law.bepress.com/alea/15th/art2 home, or foregoing the loan. The costs of these alternatives might be usefully compared to the costs of foreclosure risk, to arrive at some sense of how much risk is acceptable in a home loan.
For practical implementation of such a risk level, there are various possibilities that would be prospective, and therefore useful for leveraging the power of the secondary market to police brokers and lenders. The first possibility is to use a risk modeling system, whether a federal model established by HUD, a model established by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, or the lender's own risk models, with some controls to ensure that the models used by the lender for this purpose are the same used by any secondary market buyers of the loan. Another possibility is to use a net residual income test, requiring that a certain level of monthly income continue to be available to support each household member after the monthly loan payment.
Less direct methods of constraining risk could include insurance requirements or changes to foreclosure processes. A requirement that borrowers must purchase some level of credit disability, life, and unemployment insurance could reduce risk to the extent that disability, death, and unemployment cause defaults and foreclosures. 127 Because credit insurance at present is not competitively priced (and is therefore overpriced), minimum loss ratios for credit insurers or direct price controls would have to be established. Credit insurers that experience high losses from loans originated by particular lenders or brokers might also refuse to insure those loans, driving some risky originators out of the lending market. The price of insurance that insurers would be willing to offer on particularly risky loan transactions might also effectively price risky transactions out of the market. Increasing the competitiveness of bidding in foreclosure markets, or increasing the cost to the lender of foreclosing, could also effectively hem in loan risk levels. By increasing the competitiveness of the foreclosure process, more equity will be returned to borrowers, and, to the extent that foreclosing lenders have been the beneficiaries of the lemons problem in the foreclosure market, these lenders would no longer receive a windfall. This would make foreclosure and risky loans less attractive to the lender. Making the foreclosure process more expensive for the lender in other ways could also decrease the attractiveness of foreclosure, and decrease the risk levels of loans that lenders are willing to make. Although insurance requirements and foreclosure process reforms do not seem like constraints on borrower choice, and thus may be more politically palatable, they would effectively narrow choice because lenders would no longer offer some risky loans. In fact, the parameters of any insurance requirement or foreclosure reform should be determined by reference to the loan risk ceilings they would in effect create.
We have not been required to confront the risk issue historically, because uniformity of loan products, credit rationing, and usury laws hemmed in home loan risk and limited the borrowing population to those population segments presenting very little risk. But because we cannot rely on disclosures to resolve this issue, to formulate good public policy in today's deregulated and broadly-supplied credit market, we must define, substantively, the risk levels we seek. In the end, the line-drawing here must probably be somewhat arbitrary -no precise risk level could ever be the precisely correct one. But the same is true for the individual, if she were to grapple with the question of the right level of risk in making the loan decision for herself.
Given that many borrowers neither grapple with this question, nor deliberately make loan decisions based on the answer, some kind of floor on risk placed there by the government would be the better approach.
V. Conclusion
Some of the recent "law and behavioral science" adherents, in an attempt to match the parsimoniousness and modelability of the rational choice theory of law and economics, miss the more realistic implications of the psychological findings -that in decisionmaking, people vary from each other, and vary over time and in differing situations. Specifically, these scholars have argued that the heuristics, biases, and coping mechanisms recently identified in psychology call for a weak form of paternalism in legal regulation, a "paternalism lite." They display a sanguine belief in the ability of the law to procedurally manipulate framing effects to guide consumers' choices in the right directions, without substantive constraints on choice. In the area of consumer lending, some of these authors 129 have claimed that the disclosures required by TILA and HOEPA pose only minimal costs to society in the form of small administrative costs to lenders. They claim that the TILA price disclosure and the HOEPA foreclosure disclosure "enormously" benefit the vulnerable consumer by protecting her from unscrupulous lenders through educating her about the price of the loan and letting her know that she could lose the home if she does not make the loan payments, which in turn will help her to "act more properly in her own best interest."
130 They base these claims on their understanding of human decisionmaking generically, without so much as a peek at data about home loan decisionmaking in the real world.
A closer look at home loan decisionmaking in action paints a very different picture. The disclosures do not help a significant segment of consumers to price shop, because these consumers do not understand the disclosures, do not make use of the disclosures to price shop, and even misinterpret the price information provided in the disclosures. Borrowers already know that they could lose their homes if they do not pay the loan, so the risk disclosure is not informing the borrower of anything, just highlighting the risk with the aim of increasing the weight the borrower places on risk in determining whether to take the loan. But the disclosure is too dry and abstract, and given too late in the application process, to impact borrower decisionmaking. Due to widespread misperceptions about risks and the lack of any forces 128 Other policy measures apart from risk limits could help the functioning of the subprime home loan market. Increasing the efficiency of foreclosure markets would increase the amount of equity a borrower would receive back at foreclosure. Public policies that managed to increase the salience of alternatives to risky loans, including smaller loans, loans with fewer risky features, and forgoing the loan (and possibly facing bankruptcy with a homestead exemption as a result), might also help borrowers make better risk decisions. "Just say No to risky loans" campaigns would be useless however, as consumers are not able to determine whether the loan offered to them is risky. presenting alternatives to the loan to consumers, even more vivid disclosures are unlikely to help many consumers make a loan decision based on a true comparison of the risk posed by the loan and the amount of risk they should reasonably undertake in exchange for the benefits of the loan they are receiving. Finally, the costs of disclosures include more than administrative costs to the lender; the disclosures themselves may create an information overload and may cause the borrower to focus on less important dimensions of the decision. The disclosures give the veneer of legality to the transaction, falsely assuring some borrowers that they are more protected in the transaction than they are.
131 Lenders, courts, and the borrowers themselves are more likely to blame the borrower for obtaining an overpriced or overly risky loan, and to exonerate the seller of the loan, because the borrower received the disclosures.
132 Even Federal Reserve Board Governor Edward M. Gramlich has been quoted as saying: "'When you hear these predatory lending stories, my initial reaction is 'Gee, why couldn't the borrower get someone to review the papers before they signed them?.''"
133 The HUD-Treasury Report is uncharacteristically blunt on this point: "The fact is that written disclosure requirements, without other protections, can have the unintended effect of insulating predatory lenders where fraud or deception may have occurred."
134
The lesson here is that only by examining the evidence on the ground closely can we know whether procedural "framing" or substantive "choice narrowing" regulation or some combination is preferable for addressing a social problem. Although the insights of behavioral science in one realm can help us form working hypotheses about how people are making 131 By seeing the many government-required disclosures, some borrowers may be led to believe that the government regulates the home loan process to a greater degree than it does. This "lulling effect" of the disclosures can result in borrowers failing to be as self-protective during the process as they should be, much like the lulling effect of an aspirin bottle safety cap. As one borrower stated in describing the settlement of his home loan, at which he signed the papers quickly, without taking the time to read any of them: "I was under the impression that the settlement officer is a neutral party and the D.C. government had some oversight over all settlements." Quarles Declaration ¶ 17, Federal Trade Commission vs. Capital City Mortgage (on file with author). 132 Predatory lenders have an added reason to be meticulous in giving the required disclosures, as borrowers who receive over-priced and overly-risky loans are more likely to challenge the loans in litigation or foreclosure proceedings. Borrowers who claim that they did not understand the cost and terms of their loans when they agreed to them will face a lender brandishing the disclosures as a shield from any liability. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, for example, recently agreed with the District Court that no reasonable jury could find that a borrower did not understand that credit insurance was optional when the borrower had signed a form disclosing that 'Credit related life insurance is not required to obtain credit and will not be provided unless you sign and agree to pay the additional cost. '" Williams v. First Gov't Mortg. & Investors Corp., 225 F.3d 738, 750-51 (D.C. Cir. 2000) . This finding was upheld despite the Court's description of the borrower as follows:
Williams testified that he had only a sixth-grade education from the segregated schools of Savannah, Georgia, that he could read no more than 40 percent of a newspaper, … that he thought an interest rate of 13.90 percent exceeded 13.9 percent, and that when he bought his house in 1970, he "depended on [his wife] basically to do most of [his] reading [at the closing] 'cause she had an 11th grade education." Williams also testified that during his 20-minute meeting with [the lender] to settle the loan, the loan officers neither explained the papers he signed nor gave him time to review the papers or any papers to take home. Id. at 744-45 (internal citations to record omitted).
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Page 45 decisions in other realms, we must carefully check those hypotheses against real world data. Solutions depend crucially upon a detailed contextualized analysis, including the experiences of all affected population segments, rather than abstract theorizing. Just as parsimonious models of monolithic rational actor decisionmakers must give way to heterogeneous models of consumer decisionmaking behavior, so too a parsimonious model of monolithic paternalism lite must give way to an admission that one size will not fit all. In a market of individualized and opportunistic pricing and multifarious products faced by heterogeneous decisionmakers, no one solution will perfectly respond to the needs of all. But by understanding the heterogeneity, we can make conscious tradeoffs against a backdrop of the shared values of avoiding regressive and raciallyskewed income redistribution and neighborhood instability, and promoting competitive pricing and homeownership.
